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A Mamluk Handbook for Judges and the Doctrine of Legal 
Consequences (al‑mū ab)
Talal Al‑Azem
Abstract: By the ifteenth century, many legal jurisdictions throughout the Mamluk realm 
were pluralistic: all of the four Sunni ḍaḏhab‑s were represented by their own courts within 
a single political jurisdiction. Naturally, this pluralism had the potential of descending into 
judicial chaos, if judges hailing from diferent ḍaḏhab‑s were to refuse or negate the judgments 
of parallel ḍaḏhab‑jurisdictions. It is towards addressing this and other concerns regarding 
the judiciary that the anafī jurist al‑Qāsim Ibn Quṭlūbuġā (d. 879/1474) authored a handbook 
for judges, M abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ wa‑wāqŪʿāt aḌ‑ayyāḍ. After providing an overview of the structure 
and objective of the work, this article addresses its irst and central theme — namely, the 
doctrine of “legal consequence” (aḌ‑ḍ ab) — and analyzes how the set of procedural rules 
associated with this doctrine were part of a solution to the conlict of laws latent in a multi‑
ḍaḏhab judiciary. I argue that this doctrine, one of a number of such jurisprudential doctrines 
and procedures shared by the ḍaḏhab‑s, is evidence of the development of a wider ḍaḏhab‑law 
legal system underpinning the four Sunni ḍaḏhab‑s in the Mamluk era.
Keywords: Islamic jurisprudence, Mamluk judiciary, judicial pluralism, conlict of laws, legal 
systems, legal rules.
Résumé : Au xve siècle, de nombreuses juridictions de l’empire mamluk se caractérisaient par 
leur pluralisme. Les quatre ḍaḏhab‑s sunnites étaient chacun représentés par leur propre 
tribunal au sein d’une même juridiction politique. Un tel pluralisme risquait de conduire 
au chaos judiciaire si des juges provenant de diférents ḍaḏhab‑s refusaient ou annulaient 
le jugement énoncé par le tribunal d’un ḍaḏhab parallèle. C’est entre autres choses ain de 
résoudre ce problème que le juriste anaite al‑Qāsim Ibn Quṭlūbuġā (m. 879/1474) rédigea 
un manuel destiné aux juges, M abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ wa‑wāqŪʿāt aḌ‑ayyāḍ. Après avoir présenté la 
structure et les objectifs de l’ouvrage, le présent article en aborde le thème central – la doctrine 
de la “conséquence juridique” (aḌ‑ḍ ab) – et analyse la manière dont les règles de procédures 
associées à cette doctrine contribuaient à résoudre le conlit de lois latent dans un appareil 
judiciaire contrôlé par plusieurs ḍaḏhab‑s. Je propose que cette doctrine, qui représente l’une 
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des nombreuses règles relatives aux procédures partagées par les diférents ḍaḏhab‑s, illustre 
le développement d’un système juridique et judiciaire global, permettant de consolider le 
fonctionnement des quatre ḍaḏhab‑s sunnites à l’époque mamluke.
Mots‑clés : Droit islamique, système judiciaire mamluk, pluralisme judiciaire, conlit de lois, 
système juridique, règles juridiques.
الوايات  في  القضائّية  المنظمات  الكثير من  الميادي، كان  الخامس عشر  القرن  بحلول  الملخص : 
المملوكّية تّتسم بالتعددّية : فإن كّل من المذاهب السنّية اأربعة تمثله محكمة خاّصة تحت الواية 
السياسية المملوكية الواحدة. فكادت تؤدي هذه التعددّية إلى فوضى قضائّي إذا رفض قضاة المذاهب 
المختلفة اأحكام الصادرة عن مذهب آخر أو أبطلوها. وبهدف تطوير أجوبة فقهّية وقضائية إجرائية 
لهذه المشكلة، لقد قام الفقيه الحنفّي القاسم بن قطلوبغا )ت ١٤٧٤/٨٧٩( بتأليف كتابه موجبات 
اأحكام وواقعات اأيام. فبعد نظرة شمولية لهيكلّية وغايات هذا الكتاب، سيتطّرق هذا البحث إلى 
موضوعه اأول والمركزي – أا وهي نظرية الموجب – وكيف كانت القواعد اإجرائية الحاصلة من 
هذه النظرية تشكل جزءاً من الحل لمشكلة التعارض الحكمي المحتمل من نظام مبني على التعددّية 
القضائية. وأزعم أن هذه النظرية – وهي إحدى النظريات الفقهية واإجرائيات القضائية التي تشترك 
فيها المذاهب – تدّل على تطور تاريخي لنظاٍم قضائٍي مذهبٍي شامل وواسع النطاق يدعم المذاهب 
السنية اأربعة في العصر المملوكي.
الكلمات المحورّية : الفقه اإسامي، تاريخ النظام القضائي المملوكي، القاضي، التعددية المذهبية، 
التعددية القضائية.
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The connexion between social institutions and intellectual developments in medieval 
Islamicate societies is often a vexed question, and this remains no less the case for the 
Mamluk period. Building upon Émile Tyan’s foundational work on the judiciary in Muslim 
lands,1 a number of studies have since shed light on the factors and motives behind the 
development of pluralistic judiciaries in medieval Islamdom, culminating in the Mamluk 
quadruple judicial system instituted by Sultan al‑ āhir Baybars in 663/1265.2 Others have 
advanced our understanding of the intellectual history of Islamic law, by demonstrating 
the relationship between nascent legal‑literary genres and the rise of a taqḌīd‑based 
juristic regime in the early middle periods.3 In most of these monographs, the focus has 
(understandably) been on either institutional or intellectual developments in medieval 
Muslim law. Happily, a number of works in recent decades have attempted to link together 
these two ields of enquiry, and in so doing have not only dislodged the commonplace 
division of medieval Islamic law into clearly distinct categories of “theory” and “practice”,4 
but have also moved beyond earlier portrayals of post‑formative jurisprudence as static 
and unconnected to wider social realities,5 and the judiciary as nothing more than 
unprincipled “kadi justice”.6 Yet, in the context of the medieval judicial system, a number of 
questions regarding the relationship between legal doctrine and practice remain partially 
or completely unanswered.7
The present study poses one such question in the context of the ifteenth‑century 
Mamluk judicial system:* How did scholars and legal oicials protect against the risk 
of judicial chaos inherent in such a pluralistic judicial system, in light of the Mamluks’ 
concurrent ḍaḏhab jurisdictions? In order to answer this question in some measure, 
I shall analyse a work written in the ifteenth century that was, in part, written to address 
* I aḍ gratefuḌ to DeḌina Serrano, Geert Jan van GeḌder, and JudŪth PfeŪfer for theŪr vaḌuabḌe coḍḍents at presentatŪons 
of earḌŪer drafts of thŪs artŪcḌe, and to Ahḍad Khan, as weḌḌ as the ūournaḌ’s anonyḍous revŪewers, for theŪr heḌpfuḌ 
suggestŪons.
1. TyAn 1960.
2. escoviTz 1982, p. 529‑31; Allouche 1985, p. 317‑20; JAckson 1995, p. 52‑65; nielsen 1984, p. 167‑76; 
RApopoRT 2003, p. 210‑28.
3. FAdel 1996, p. 193‑233; cAldeR 2010, esp. p. 74‑115.
4. Baber Johansen and Wael Hallaq have done the most to dispel such notions. See especially JohAnsen 1995, 
p. 135‑56; Ūdeḍ 1999; Ūdeḍ 2007, p. 143‑63; hAllAq 1994, p. 29‑65; and Ūdeḍ 1999, p. 437‑66.
5. Again, see JohAnsen 1988; cf. ibRAhim 2009, p. 337‑82. These historiographical advances in bridging the 
disciplinary divide have been abetted by recent progress in the editing of legal documentary sources from 
the High Middle Periods, which promise much especially to the Mamluk historian who has hitherto been 
lummoxed by the lack of extant judicial records. See now ReinFAndT 2013, p. 285‑309; mouTon, souRdel, and 
souRdel‑Thomine 2013; and “Islamic Law Materialized”, a project hosted by the Arabic section of the Institut de 
Recherche et d’Histoire des Textes, at http://www.ilm‑project.net/
6. See poweRs 1992, p. 315‑42; and FAdel 1997, p. 49‑86.
7. A recent exception is Christian mülleR 2013, “Mamluk Law: a reassessment”, in which the question as to how 
Mamluk law actually functioned is correctly related to that of the existence of a unique Mamluk “legal system”. 
While the present paper refrains from committing to the speciic sociological approach and terminology of 
Joseph Raz as employed by Müller, it does validate Müller’s assertion that only through studying the practice of 
law in a speciic society can we better understand the relationship of iqh to historical legal systems.
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exactly this problem. M abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ wa‑wāqŪʿāt aḌ‑ayyāḍ8 (“The Legal Consequences of 
Judgments, and the Novel Cases of the Age”) was authored by a late‑Mamluk anafī jurist, 
al‑Qāsim Ibn Quṭlūbuġā (d. 879/1474), a highly respected scholar in his day, and deemed 
by later fuqahā’ to have been a ḍu tahŪd of the ḍaḏhab.9 M abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ was a legal 
handbook written by a celebrated ḍu tahŪd‑level jurist for the judges of the pluralistic 
Mamluk judiciary, to serve as a reference work on judicial probḌeḍata — substantial and 
procedural — that might be faced in a courtroom situated within the pluralistic Mamluk 
judicial system. As a ḍu tahŪd‑level jurist attempting to systematise both procedural and 
substantive rules needed by then‑contemporary judges, Ibn Quṭlūbuġā provides us with a 
clear window, I argue, unto the existence of a wider ḍaḏhab‑law system constructed by the 
ḍaḏhab‑based jurists themselves, and within which the individual ḍaḏhab‑s were subsumed. 
This ḍaḏhab‑law legal system — built as it was upon intellectual traditions, positive laws, 
and jurisprudential mechanisms developed over hundreds of years preceding — was meant 
to provide a stable, predictable, and ultimately rational rule of law in Mamluk jurisdictions 
and society, despite the presence of a judicial pluralism that had been established and 
sanctioned by the political regime.
M abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ addresses a number of the related jurisprudential doctrines which, 
I argue, comprise the ḍaḏhab‑law system. The present paper, however, addresses only 
one of the body of jurisprudential doctrines and procedures shared by the four ḍaḏhab‑s: 
namely, the legal doctrine of “legal consequence” (aḌ‑ḍ ab), the irst doctrine treated 
by Ibn Quṭlūbuġā in his work. We shall begin by presenting a brief outline of the M abāt 
8. Ibn Quṭlūbuġā, M abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ, p. 591. It is only correct at this juncture that I declare my indebtedness to the 
editor of the M abāt, Mu ammad al‑Muʿīnī, whose philological eforts in identifying the persons, texts, and 
even quoted passages mentioned in the text spared me some of the groundwork required for the historical and 
legal analysis that the present article undertakes. I have come across only one study which has identiied the 
importance of the Mu abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ in the context of the history of Islamic jurisprudence, namely that of Lutz 
wiedeRhold 1996, p. 234‑304. Whilst Wiederhold’s work, alongside Jackson’s study of al‑Qarāfī of the same year, 
was an important advance in its study of the role of tar ī  in resolving conlicts of legal doctrines in the history 
of Islamic jurisprudence, the author unfortunately often conlated and confused tar ī  in each of the disciplines 
of uṣ Ḍ aḌ‑iqh and iqh, where in the former it serves to resolve conlicting hermeneutical “indicators” of the 
law in the ḍu tahŪd’s task of formulating iqh opinions, whilst in the latter tar ī  serves to identify the correct 
rule of a ḍaḏhab out of the body of existing and conlicting legal opinions. In so doing, Wiederhold fails to 
fully appreciate the signiicance of Ibn Quṭlūbuġā’s contributions in the context of the ḍaḏhab‑law tradition 
on the one hand, and to the Mamluk pluralistic judicial system on the other, partially misunderstanding the 
relationship between the jurist’s doctrine of the ḍ ab and of tar ī . Likewise, Zouhair Ghazzal touches upon 
the notion of the ḍ ab in his ethnography of court documents in GhAzzAl (2007), p. 382‑83. However, he 
appears to incorrectly attribute the coinage of the term “aḌ‑ ukḍ bŪ‑Ḍ‑ḍ ab” to the anafī jurist Ibn Nuǧaym 
(d. 970/1562); as shall be demonstrated below, the history of this jurisprudential doctrine dates much earlier 
and precedes even Ibn Quṭlūbuġā himself. Later in his extensive and insightful work (IbŪd., 485), though, Ghazzal 
does recognize that Ibn Nuǧaym, having lived through the transition to Ottoman rule several decades after 
Ibn Quṭlūbuġā, draws upon a previous work our Mamluk‑era jurist, namely in a collection of fatwas entitled 
aḌ‑Fatāwā aḌ‑QāsŪḍŪyya that also relies upon some of the very jurisprudential doctrines in providing responses to 
questions posed to Ibn Quṭlūbuġā.
9. Al‑Sa āwī, aḌ‑ aw’ aḌ‑ḌāḍŪʿ, VI, p. 184–190. On Ibn Quṭlūbuġā’s biography and for assessments of his historical 
importance, cf. RosenThAl, s.v. “Ibn Ḳuṭlūbughā”, EncycḌopaedŪa of IsḌaḍ, Second EdŪtŪon 2014; mundy 2004, 
p. 142‑65; and Al‑Azem 2011, p. 26‑36.
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aḌ‑a kāḍ’s structure, in order to establish Ibn Quṭlūbuġā’s overarching objective in 
authoring the work, and the relative position of the doctrine of ḍ ab therein. By means 
of a close reading of the arguments and methods utilised by Ibn Quṭlūbuġā in the sections 
of the work treating “legal consequence”, we shall analyse how the set of procedural rules 
following from this doctrine formed part of the solution to the conlict of laws latent in the 
multi‑ḍaḏhab judiciary.
The structure and audience of Mū abāt al‑a kām wa‑wāqiʿāt al‑ayyām
According to ams al‑Dīn al‑Sa āwī (d. 902/1497), a friend of Ibn Quṭlūbuġā and 
his principal biographer, the latter held neither judicial nor teaching posts that were 
particularly prestigious, despite being recognised in his own lifetime as one of the foremost 
jurists of the anai ḍaḏhab of his age. Rather, living for much of his life simply in a Sui 
convent in Cairo, he authored more than a hundred works10 and was frequently consulted 
on controversial and unprecedented, contemporary matters (nawāzŪḌ).11
The opening lines of the M abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ intimate one occasion in which the author 
was presented with such a contemporary matter: namely, a case of conlicting laws 
resulting from the plurality of legal jurisdictions in the Mamluk judiciary. While we shall 
return below to a fuller analysis of the jurisprudential ideas presented in this introduction, 
we may begin by noting that it is the resolution of the jurisprudential problems underlying 
this incident, whilst providing judges of the day with clear guidance as to the procedural 
dimensions of their responsibilities — advanced via the familiar trope of a favoured student 
requesting an explicit treatment of these probḌeḍata by the senior jurist12 — that serve 
as the inal cause of the M abāt. This favoured student’s request serves the rhetorical 
demarcation between the introduction and the very body of the work, the structure of 
which we may thus reasonably divide into a preface and four main parts:13
10. For the most complete catalogue of Ibn Quṭlūbuġā’s output to date, see the introduction of Ḍiyā’ al‑Dīn Yūnus 
to his edition of Ibn Quṭlūbuġā, M abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ.
11. Al‑Sa āwī, aḌ‑ aw’ aḌ‑ḌāḍŪʿ, VI, p. 188.
12. Ibn Quṭlūbuġā, M abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ, p. 73.
13. It should be noted that, in the printed edition of 1983, it is the editor who has introduced most of the section 
headings, his additions of which he demarcated by parentheses: p. 110 (aḌ‑daʿwā), p. 132 (aḌ‑ḫaṣḍ fī aḌ‑daʿwā), 
p. 181 (aḌ‑dafʿ wa‑ḍasā’ŪḌŪ‑hŪ), p. 196 (aḌ‑taṣ ī ), p. 414 (aḌ‑ḍa ā Ūr wa‑Ḍ‑sŪ ŪḌḌāt), p. 420 (aḌ‑sŪ ŪḌḌāt), p. 437 (Ūthbāt 
aḌ‑sŪ ŪḌḌ), and p. 458 (aḌ‑ḫaḌaḌ wa‑Ḍ‑ḍaṭāʿŪn fī aḌ‑ḍa ā Ūr wa‑Ḍ‑sŪ ŪḌḌāt). Only the section headers on p. 75 (ḍ abāt 
aḌ‑a kāḍ) and p. 450 (aḌ‑kŪtāb aḌ‑ ukḍī) are free of these editorial markers. Indeed, the section header for 
aḌ‑daʿāwa on p. 110, for example, demarcates the beginning of the author’s catalogue of formulas to be used 
during pleadings; as for the theoretical discussion as to the conditions for the validity of claims ( arā’Ūṭ aḌ‑daʿwā 
aḌ‑ṣa ī a), thus marking the beginning of the section treating pleadings, this actually begins on p. 104 of the 
edition, without the beneit of a heading.
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• ḥ1. The preface, recounting the incident of judicial error leading to the compilation of the work, 
which the author uses to establish the supra‑ḍaḏhab nature of the doctrine of ḍ abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ 
(p. 69‑74);14
• ḥ2. On ḌegaḌ consequences: a presentation of the theory of legal consequences (aḌ‑ḍ ab) and a 
delimitation of its scope, as well as a catalogue of the consequential obligations resulting from 
court decisions (ḍ abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ) (p. 75‑104);
• ḥ3. On proceedŪngs: the conditions and procedures for establishing a claim (daʿāwā) and a defence 
(dafʿ aḌ‑ḫuṣ ḍāt) (p. 104‑131);
• ḥ4. On bŪndŪng precedents: a catalogue of the correct rules — the juristic precedents — upon which 
judgments are to be issued (taṣ ī ) (p. 196‑413);15
• ḥ5. On court docuḍentatŪon: the procedures and models for court documentation, namely, oicial 
minutes of the court (aḌ‑ḍa ā Ūr), judicial registers (aḌ‑sŪ ŪḌḌāt), and notarizations (aḌ‑kutub 
aḌ‑ ukḍŪyya) (p. 414‑468).
In each of the main four sections, the procedural rules, substantive rules, or the models 
are organized according to the regular organizational rubric of iqh works. As may be 
expected, however, only those sections of iqh that treat civil or criminal matters — those 
issues which are the within the remit of a court of law — are mentioned.
One can perceive in these four sections an organizational scheme that mirrors the 
process that a judge would follow in working through a case presented to him, and indeed 
each of these ive parts comprises subsections and instructions as to the details of the task. 
First, the judge is to recognize and determine what obligations, if any, would result from 
the action under question, whether disputed or simply requiring notarization. Next, the 
establishment of pleadings, in which each of the claimant and the defendant are identiied; 
valid claims are distinguished from invalid claims; who from the claimants, defendants, and 
witnesses must be present or summoned to the court; all of which includes the drafting 
of answers by the defendant to the plaintif’s claim, and likewise replies by the primary 
plaintif (dafʿ aḌ‑dafʿ) to the defendant’s defense or counterclaims. The next stage would 
involve the judge determining which of the legal opinions transmitted in the centuries‑old 
iqh works associated with his court’s ḍaḏhab was to be deemed the juristically‑established 
precedent (aḌ‑ḍuḫtār), the correct legal rule (aḌ‑rā Ū , or aḌ‑ṣa ī ), and thus was to form the 
ḌegaḌḌy‑bŪndŪng basis of his judgment or decree. Finally comes documentation through the 
drafting of minutes, registers, and debt records; and the execution of the court’s decrees 
by writ (tanfīḏāt).
Our author’s rhetorical use of transitional phrases provides further evidence as to 
what type of work he intended, and as to the audience he was addressing. Expressions such 
as “fa‑Ūḏā ʿarafta ḏāḌŪk…” (“if you now know this”) are found repeatedly in the work: they 
14. All page ranges refer to the printed edition by Al‑muʿīnī of Ibn Quṭlūbuġā, M abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ.
15. The use of the term “precedent” in the context of Islamic law is, of course, contested. Nonetheless, I would posit 
that this usage is not only justiied but indeed necessary in order to understand the history and functioning of 
the ḍaḏhab‑law system for which I am arguing here. I hope to demonstrate this point in a forthcoming article 
that will serve as a continuation to the present study, and where I will treat the M abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ’s fourth 
section on binding precedents more fully.
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regularly mark a transition from one concept, procedure, or catalogue of rules or formulas, 
to the next matter that must be borne in mind by the reader; or from the demonstration 
of an overarching jurisprudential doctrine to a demonstration of the particular rules or 
formulas speciic to a certain section of the law that should be observed by the reader. 
Thus, for example, in transitioning from his preface, Ibn Quṭlūbuġā turns to fulilling his 
favored student’s request of spelling out the legal consequences for all legal transactions 
(aḌ‑taṣarrufāt aḌ‑ arʿŪyya) which they might encounter, “that perchance”, the student reasons, 
“he who learns it might be saved from the blindness in which he inds himself”.16 After a 
quick sampling of ive anafī iqh works which provide proof that the consequences of 
legally‑signiicant acts are to be found explicitly mentioned in the works of the ḍaḏhab, Ibn 
Quṭlūbuġā turns to cataloguing the consequences of legally‑signiicant acts, announcing 
this transition with the phrase “Ūḏā ʿurŪfa hāḏā…” (“If this now is known”).17 Again, having 
completed his inventory of such consequences, he declares, “If you now know this, then 
understand that the legal consequences must be explicitly stated in judicial decisions, if 
that consequence is itself the very purpose of the litigation”,18 at which he proceeds to 
spell out the various consequences that may be entailed by any given act. Again, some 
pages later, he precedes his catalogue of the formulas utilised for expressing a valid claim 
by stating: “And now, if you have come to know the conditions of a valid claim, then realise 
that most jurists stipulate that such conditions be explicitly mentioned in a judgment, in 
order for the claim to be deemed valid”.19 Again and again, the beneiciaries of the book are 
addressed (“Here, then, do I present you with some of the relevant cases”20), in clear and 
instructive, almost paternal, tones.21 Both the practical structure, as well as the rhetorical 
device of addressing someone who would use the book in the context of working through 
a legal proceeding, underline that the M abāt was intended to serve as a handbook for 
judges, and particularly for those whose own mastery of the iqh tradition which informs 
the substantive and procedural rules undergirding their oicial responsibilities was found 
wanting.
This, then, is a book of law for legal oicials, and not a book of iqh for jurists. While 
dependent upon the substantial and procedural rules developed by jurists in the disciplinary 
works of iqh, the M abāt is written for judges who have been appointed by the state to 
a ḍaḏhab‑speciic judiciary, and who require guidance as to the correct procedures and 
16. Ibn Quṭlūbuġā, M abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ, p. 73.
17. Ibn Quṭlūbuġā, M abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ, p. 74.
18. Ibn Quṭlūbuġā, M abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ, p. 102.
19. Ibn Quṭlūbuġā, M abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ, p. 109.
20. Ibn Quṭlūbuġā, M abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ, p. 132.
21. “In light of the preceding, know that litigation often entails a defense, with which you must necessarily be 
familiar. Here, then, is an introduction to it, before we delve into its details.” (p. 181); “And here I shall now 
explicitly relate for your beneit the binding rule (aḌ‑ḍuḫtār)…” (p. 196); and “If you now know this, all that 
remains is for it to be formulated in writing, the locus of which are the judicial registers and court records…” 
(p. 414).
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legal rules to follow in executing their jurisdictionally‑delimited duties. As noted above, 
there is no mention of those issues of iqh that are ritual or merely moral matters left to 
the individual’s conscience and God: the remit is that of law (qa ā’), and not of religiously‑
established morality (dŪyānat).22 But it is clearly not primarily a compendium of positive‑
law: the structure and literary openings and transitions of the work betray a procedural 
concern, even if each of the sections then details the positive legal rules that the judge is 
to observe. Rather, as has been demonstrated, Ibn Quṭlūbuġā is directly addressing not the 
jurists (as legal scholars) but the judges (as legal oicials) of his day. The M abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ 
is a handbook for judges, written by a leading jurist, with the aim of aiding those struggling 
in their posts with the very objectives, mechanisms, and substance of their craft.
The theory of legal consequences
Having established both the objective and audience of the M abāt, we shall turn now 
to an exploration of the two parts that treat speciically the doctrine and procedures of a 
“legal consequence”, or aḌ‑ḍ ab; namely, the preface and the subsequent section. We shall 
proceed by means of a close textual reading, which will aford us the ability to analyze the 
doctrines and arguments forwarded by Ibn Quṭlūbuġā regarding the ḍ ab. The objective 
is to examine how a Mamluk‑era jurist, addressing the problems arising out of the 
pluralistic judiciary, developed and utilized the concept of the ḍ ab in his construction 
of a jurisprudential solution to this problem; and to demonstrate how the procedural rules 
that he posits serve as technical “safety mechanisms” for the smooth running of the judicial 
system, by clearly delimiting the range of actions that inexperienced (or unscrupulous) 
judges may efect in executing their responsibilities in the context of the Mamluk judiciary.
Before beginning to walk the reader through the practical aspects of his judicial 
responsibilities, Ibn Quṭlūbuġā prefaces the M abāt with a deinition and defense of the 
jurisprudential theory of ḍ abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ (the consequential obligations resulting from 
court decisions). He does so by narrating the following judicial incident:
My opinion has been solicited regarding the following case: A man mortgaged his real property, 
upon which a anbalī judge ratiied the act and pronounced the consequences of the contract 
to be in efect ( akaḍa fī‑hī bŪ‑Ḍ‑ḍ ab ākŪḍ anbaḌī). Thereafter, the mortgagor (aḌ‑rāhŪn) 
vested the mortgaged property into an endowment trust (waqafa aḌ‑ʿŪqār). Ratifying the act, 
a anafī judge pronounced the consequences of this endowment to be in efect and legally 
binding. Thereafter, the mortgagor redeemed the morgage, sold the property, and sought out 
the anbalī judge in order that the latter may decree the endowment void (bāṭŪḌ) and the sale 
valid, on the basis that, according to the judge’s ḍaḏhab, any transaction involving a mortgaged 
property by the mortgagor is invalid (ʿadaḍ ṣŪ at taṣarruf aḌ‑rāhŪn fī aḌ‑rahn).23
22. On this distinction, see JohAnsen 1988, p. 264‑82, who engages with earlier arguments of both Joseph Schacht 
and Chaik Chehata regarding its ramiications for the relationship of law to ethics in iqh. For examples of the 
utility of this distinction in modern iqh debates, see khAn 2008, p. 95.
23. Ibn Quṭlūbuġā, M abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ, p. 69‑70.
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From the beginning, then, the M abāt is framed by problems resulting from a 
pluralistic judiciary. There is a conlict of laws resulting from the string of legal transactions 
surrounding a single piece of property, since each of the state‑sanctioned anafī and 
anbalī judiciaries hold difering views as to validity of one of the transactions: according 
to the anafī ḍaḏhab, the property may not be sold since it has been vested into a trust, 
and this investiture has been ratiied by a judge; according to the anbalīs, no property 
held in mortgage may be sold, gifted, or otherwise disposed of (such as through alienation 
of the property into mortmain via the trust) by the mortgagor whilst held in mortgage by 
the mortgagee, and any such transaction would be deemed invalid and thus void. As such, 
the anbalī judge deemed the anafī’s ratiication of the endowment whilst the property 
was held in mortgage void, and — seeing as the property was later redeemed before it was 
consequently sold — pronounced the later sale of the property valid. The anafī judge, it is 
safe to assume, begged to difer.
Ibn Quṭlūbuġā proceeds to deliver his response to this consultation, with important 
consequences for the anbalī judge and his judicial act:
I responded: The man’s vesting the mortgaged property into a trust was a valid act (ṣa ī ), 
while the subsequent sale is to be deemed void (bāṭŪḌ). Furthermore, the anbalī judge has no 
right to interfere in the trust (waqf) by deeming it void; and even if he should do so, his decision 
is of no legal consequence.24
Having reported his response, the author continues on to relate a scholarly session 
involving a group of judicial appointees (ḫuḌafā’ aḌ‑ ukḍ aḌ‑ʿazīz) representing all four 
ḍaḏhab‑s at which he was present, and in which there arose a discussion of his solution 
to the problem of the conlict of laws in the judiciary. As beits the ailiations of his 
interlocutors, he begins to justify his response by appealing to two jurisprudential 
principles and doctrines from not only his own anafī ḍaḏhab, but from across all four 
schools; principles which, it is implied, the anbalī judge in the case at hand failed to 
observe: irst, that judgments may not be arrived at through intuition ( ads) or conjecture 
(taḫḍīn), and that any judgment so passed is not to be executed (ġayr nāiḏ); and second, 
that a judge has the authority to issue judgment only on the case presented to his court. 
Based upon these two interrelated principles, a judge is not permitted to issue judgment 
on any matter other than that legal action brought to his court; for, to do so, he would be 
passing judgment on a matter “that is known neither to the claimant, nor to the defendant, 
nor most likely even to the judge himself”;25 the implication being that this is the error of 
which the anbalī judge was guilty.
Here, an objection may have been raised on behalf of the anbalī judge: was the second 
judgment of the anbalī judge not merely in keeping with the legal consequences (the 
ḍ ab) of the irst? That is to say, since in the irst instance the transfer of the property’s 
24. Ibn Quṭlūbuġā, M abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ, p. 70.
25. Ibn Quṭlūbuġā, M abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ, p. 70.
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status into the mortgage had been ratiied by the anbalī judge in accordance with the 
doctrine of his school of law, should not also any further actions be assessed in light of the 
legal consequence of this initial decision?
Ibn Quṭlūbuġā responds with a resounding “no”, and, averting any charge of ḍaḏhab‑
bias, replies: “Never have we heard any leading scholar of the anbali ḍaḏhab ever term 
such a thing ‘a legal consequence (ḍ ab)’.”26 In support of this, he relates a deinition 
of the ḍ ab from an epistle of the Chief Judge of the anbalites, Mu ibb al‑Dīn A mad 
b. Na r Allāh al‑Baġdādī (d. 844/1440), dedicated to the very subject:
As for “issuing judgment as to the legal consequences (aḌ‑ ukḍ bŪ‑Ḍ‑ḍ ab)”, this denotes 
issuing judgment as to the consequences of a claim made in the court that is supported by 
documentary or other evidence (ḍ ab aḌ‑daʿwā aḌ‑ṯābŪtah bŪ‑Ḍ‑bayyŪna aww ġayrŪhā). This is the 
meaning of “the legal consequence (aḌ‑ḍ ab)ǧ, for which there is no other meaning.27
The citation continues to demonstrate how the legal consequence is to be determined:
A claim is examined as follows: if the claim comprises that which necessitate the validity of the 
contract under dispute (aḌ‑ʿaqd aḌ‑ḍuddaʿā bŪ‑hī), then “a judgment as to the legal consequences 
(aḌ‑ ukḍ bŪ‑Ḍ‑ḍ ab)” is a judgment as to the contract’s validity ( ukḍ bŪ‑Ḍ‑ṣŪ a); if the claim 
does not comprise that which necessitates the validity of the contract under dispute, then “a 
judgment as to the legal consequences” may not be a judgment as to the contract’s validity.28
This sentence determines that “a judgment issued in accordance with legal 
consequences”, then, is intrinsic to the case at hand, and does not entail issuing judgment 
in light of previous judgments of the legal status of the objects of litigation; it involves 
determining, for example, the validity of a contract or otherwise. Ibn Quṭlūbuġā ends his 
citation of Ibn Na r‑Allāh al‑Baġdādī with this inal clariication as to the nature of the 
ḍ ab:
A “judgment as to the legal consequences” is a pronouncement upon the contracting party 
(aḌ‑ʿāqŪd) as to the obligations for which he is liable resulting from the contract; it is not to 
adjudge the contract itself (Ḍā ukḍ bŪ‑Ḍ‑ʿaqd).29
This, then, is an explicit statement, by a leading anbalī jurist, that a judge is only to 
adjudicate upon the object of the claim brought before him, and upon no other matter. 
Based upon this, Ibn Quṭlūbuġā now turns to delivering his own verdict regarding the 
anbalī judge’s actions in the original story:
What we may learn from this is that if the [ anbalī] judge was aware of this [i.e. the meaning of 
aḌ‑ḍ ab], then his judgment could only have been issued regarding the validity of the mortgage 
– a matter for which no litigation was brought before him – or regarding the admission (Ūqrār) 
of the mortgagor as to having mortgaged his property, and of the mortgagee as to having 
26. Ibn Quṭlūbuġā, M abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ, p. 70.
27. Ibn Quṭlūbuġā, M abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ, p. 71.
28. Ibn Quṭlūbuġā, M abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ, p. 71.
29. Ibn Quṭlūbuġā, M abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ, p. 71.
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received the security; he has not been appointed to pass judgment as to any other disputed 
matter beyond this. If, however, this judge was not aware of this, then he will have passed 
judgment on an ambiguous matter the meaning of which he does not actually understand.30
Ibn Quṭlūbuġā has now rendered the anbalī judge’s invalidation itself invalid, on the 
basis that the principle of legal consequences is shared across the ḍaḏhabs, and that the 
anbalī exceeded the remit of his jurisdiction and appointment by passing judgment on a 
matter which had not been brought in litigation before him.
Our author’s audience of judges is not yet satisied: what, then, is the status of 
the action of the anafī judge who had ratiied the vesting of the mortgaged property 
into a trust? Ibn Quṭlūbuġā responds that, so long as the judge had passed judgment in 
accordance with the legal consequences spelt out by the jurists of the ḍaḏhab of his judicial 
appointment, then the mention of “legal consequences”, here, would entail a judgment as 
to the irrevocability (Ḍuz ḍ) of the mortmain property held in trust, for the jurists have 
explicitly stated that an act such as that performed by this particular property’s owner 
is valid, and, once the property has been vested into a trust, the endowment cannot be 
revoked under any circumstance. And what might be the textual evidence for this from the 
ḍaḏhab, ask his interlocutors?
I replied: The jurists have said that if, based upon a valid claim and suicient witnessing 
thereto, the vesting of a property into trust had been ratiied by a judge, only for the property 
owner to then negate that he had actually vested the property as such; and if it was the opinion 
of the judge that the vesting of the property into the trust had been valid and binding: in such 
a case, it is not permissible under any circumstance to revoke the trust. By consensus of the 
jurists (bŪ‑Ḍ‑Ū ḍāʿ), the investiture is to be deemed executed (nafaḏ).31
In short, then, the action of the anbalī judge had been illegal due to his 
misunderstanding of the notion of the ḍ ab: his power of adjudication extends only to 
the case immediately before him, and does not derive from his having previously ratiied 
the mortgaging of the property. The act of the anafī judge was, on the other hand, legal, 
because it was a distinct act, adjudged only in light of its own internal conditions whilst 
respecting the legal consequences of past judicial acts where were themselves issued 
in accordance with that other judiciary’s own procedural and substantial laws. In other 
words, the anafī judge correctly issued a decision only as to the legal consequences of the 
speciic action brought before him (namely, the vesting of the property into the trust) and 
did not interfere or attempt to overturn the anbalī judgment. Just as the anbalī’s original 
judicial act was procedurally and substantially valid and binding (such that it could not 
be overturned or revoked by any other judge) and its legal consequences executed (such 
that the property was deemed to be held in security by the mortgagee), likewise was the 
anafī’s ruling procedurally correct according to his own ḍaḏhab’s rules. As such, the legal 
30. Ibn Quṭlūbuġā, M abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ, p. 72.
31. Ibn Quṭlūbuġā, M abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ, p. 72.
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consequences of his legal decision was binding not only upon the litigants but also upon 
the judges of all concurrent ḍaḏhab‑judiciaries: the property was now, irrevocably, a waqf.
Ending this narrative, Ibn Quṭlūbuġā recalls how a inal question was then put to him: 
Have your anafī jurists explicitly delineated what the legal consequences of an act of 
vesting property into a trust entails? “Yes”, he answers, “and likewise they have explicitly 
detailed the legal consequences of all other legal transactions (bŪ‑ḍawā Ūb aḍīʿ aḌ‑taṣarrufāt 
aḌ‑ arʿŪyya), which is something I am not aware has been done by the jurists of any ḍaḏhab 
other than our own; and God knows best.”32
It is at this point that the preface comes to an end, and he turns now to an explication 
of the legal consequences of the various legal acts, civil or criminal, treated by iqh. But 
before we turn to an analysis of this irst section of the handbook, it is worth pausing to 
note not only what he has deconstructed in his retelling of this tale of a conlict of laws, 
but also what Ibn Quṭlūbuġā does not comment upon: namely, that the man involved in 
this case was practicing a type of “forum‑shopping”. As a private individual involved in 
a civil matter, he was free to bring his case before the ḍaḏhab‑court of his choice, as the 
four ḍaḏhab‑courts all had concurrent jurisdiction.33 Our anafī jurisprudent does not 
chastise the man for moving between ḍaḏhab‑courts, despite noting that the man clearly 
was seeking to manipulate the jurisdictional concurrence to his own advantage. Many 
earlier Mamluk‑era jurists across the ḍaḏhab‑s had argued that “the layman is bound by 
no ḍaḏhab” (aḌ‑ʿāḍḍī Ḍā ḍaḏhab Ḍa‑hu), and as such was free to seek the legal consultation 
(fatwā) of a jurist of any ḍaḏhab.34 Ibn Quṭlūbuġā here is dealing with its corollary – the 
seeking of a judgment from a court of any ḍaḏhab – and signiicantly does not censure 
the activity of the plaintif in and of itself. As he clariies elsewhere in the M ab, the 
remit of the courts of law is either validity or invalidity (aḌ‑ ukḍ bŪ‑Ḍ‑ṣŪ a); the wider range 
or moral categories found in the works of iqh are issues of the moral conscience of the 
individual, and are not the business of the judge.
To summarize, Ibn Quṭlūbuġā’s answer implies a jurisprudential theory of legal 
consequences which, in light of the ḍaḏhab‑pluralistic system of the age, establishes the 
illegality of the anbalī judge’s invalidating an earlier court ruling issued by the anafī 
judge. So long as the two cases were distinct, any judgment that a subsequent judge issues 
must assume the legal validity of all consequences and obligations resulting (ḍ abāt) 
from a preceding case. By means of this narrative, our anafī master‑jurist has sought to 
establish that the doctrine of legal consequences (aḌ‑ḍ ab) is clearly attested to in works 
32. Ibn Quṭlūbuġā, M abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ, p. 72‑73.
33. This was not necessarily the case for criminal afairs, where the state and its oicials was responsible for 
initiating proceedings, which often could involve the determination of ḍaḏhab‑jurisdiction. For examples of 
this, and the role of the āiʿī Chief Judge (qā ī aḌ‑qu āt) in overseeing the apportionment of such cases, see 
RApopoRT 2003, p. 223.
34. See, for example, the earlier āiʿī jurist Badr al‑Dīn al‑Zarka ī (d. 794/1392) in his aḌ‑Ba r aḌ‑ḍu īṭ, VI, p. 319–20, 
who relates the opinions of a number of Mamluk‑era jurists from multiple ḍaḏhab‑s on this point.
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from beyond the anafī ḍaḏhab, and as such is binding upon all judges appointed in their 
respective concurrent courts within the judiciary.
*
As mentioned in our outline of the work, the transition from the preface to the body 
of the handbook proper is marked by the rhetorical device of a favored student requesting 
that the elder jurist spell out the legal consequences for all legal transactions (aḌ‑taṣarrufāt 
aḌ‑ arʿŪyya). The rhetorical tones of the preface now disappear, and Ibn Quṭlūbuġā prepares 
to deliver his irst catalogue of such matters to which a judge must have recourse 
when issuing judgments. Before doing so, though, he prefaces his cataloguing the legal 
consequences of various legal transactions with a treatment as to the terminology 
associated with the concept of the ḍ ab. He begins with a deinition from a anbalī work 
entitled aḌ‑MustawʿŪb:35
The consequence of a performative act is the legal efect resulting from the Lawgiver making 
that act a cause for the attainment of the efect (ḍ ab aḌ‑Ūn ā’ aṯar aʿḌ aḌ‑ ārŪʿ ḏāḌŪka aḌ‑Ūn ā’ 
sababan fī uṣ ḌŪ‑hŪ).
That is to say, the Lawgiver has created a legal causal relationship between ActŪon A 
and Efect B; if ActŪon A is deemed to have occurred (as determined through the fulillment 
of legal stipulations and conditions speciic to that act), Efect B is necessarily entailed. 
Ibn Quṭlūbuġā continued on to clarify that the fellows of his legal school (aṣ ābu‑nā, i.e. 
the anafīs) use a number of synonymous terms for the concept of legal efects: the 
consequence (aḌ‑ḍ ab), the requisite (aḌ‑ḍuqta ā), and the judgment (aḌ‑ ukḍ). Ibn 
Quṭlūbuġā then provides a couple of samples from two well‑known anafī iqh works — the 
HŪdāyah of al‑Marġīnānī (d. 597/1197) and the ar  aḌ‑ āḍŪʿ aḌ‑ṣaġīr of al‑ adr al‑ ahīd Ibn 
Māza (d. 616/1219) — to show how, in their respective treatments of the same iqh case, 
one author might use the term ḍ ab, while the other would use either of its synonyms, 
ḍuqta ā or ukḍ.36
Having dealt with the deinition and synonyms of the ḍ ab, Ibn Quṭlūbuġā then 
presents his catalogue of the legal consequences of various acts. This (like the three 
35. I have identiied two works of iqh with this title: a anbalī work entitled aḌ‑MustawʿŪb by Nā ir al‑Dīn 
Mu ammad b. ʿAbd Allāh al‑Sāmirī al‑ anbalī (d. 616/1219‑20); and aḌ‑MustawʿŪb ḌŪ‑zŪyādāt ḍasā’ŪḌ aḌ‑Mabs ṭ 
ḍŪḍḍā Ḍaysa fī aḌ‑Mudawwana of the Malikī jurist ʿAbd al‑Ra mān al‑Qayrawānī (d. 380/990), on which 
see Al‑ziriklī 2002, aḌ‑AʿḌāḍ, III, p. 325. In light of the context in which it has been quoted, I am operating 
on the assumption that it is the anbalī work that is indeed the referent (this is also the assumption of 
the M abāt’s editor): the fact that the theory and procedural dimensions of the ḍ ab appear to arise 
historically in the writings of post‑ “classical”‑era jurists (of which the anbalī al‑Sāmirī is one) grappling 
with the developments of pluralistic judiciaries and colleges of law lends further support to this conclusion. 
 Further to this inal point, it should be noted that a similar deinition and discussion of the scope and role of 
the ḍ ab is also found in an epistle of the ḍu tahŪd‑level āiʿī jurist Tāqī al‑Dīn al‑Subkī (d. 756/1355), in his 
Fatāwā aḌ‑Subkī, II, p. 368–386, “Kitāb al‑Iqrār”, ḥ2. Again, the Mamluk‑era al‑Subkī also engages with the views 
and opinions of both his and the other ḍaḏhab‑s as to the theory and utility of the ḍ ab, and does not treat 
this procedural matter simply as one of a single ḍaḏhab’s unique rules, further lending support to the historical 
importance of this doctrine in the context of the pluralistic Mamluk judiciary.
36. Ibn Quṭlūbuġā, M abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ, p. 73.
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subsequent parts) is arranged according to the organisational rubric (tabwīb) of a subset of 
anafī textbooks of iqh:37 the HŪdāyah,38Kanz aḌ‑daqā’Ūq, aḌ‑Wāfī, and aḌ‑Kāfī.39 These popular 
works frequently formed the basic curriculum of legal studies in Ibn Quṭlūbuġā’s era; legal 
oicials such as judges and muftis would have been familiar with this arrangement, thus 
facilitating easy discovery of the legal consequences required for the case at hand. The 
ḍ abāt are adduced from major legal reference works such as aḌ‑Mu Ūṭ aḌ‑Burhānī,40Badā’Ūʿ 
aḌ‑ṣanā’Ūʿ,41 and aḌ‑KŪfāya:42 these are voluminous and conceptually dense works, authored 
by Central Asian jurists, often viewed as a peak of anafī iqh writing in the Middle Periods.43 
As a result, they are also often seen as daunting challenges to the average student of law, 
and would not have generally formed part of basic legal studies; instead, they would rather 
have served as reference works or been read with advanced jurists beyond the conines of a 
basic law college’s course.44 This, then, is the senior jurist’s scholarly favour to the harried 
(and, in the view of Ibn Quṭlūbuġā, imperfectly educated45) professional judges. It should 
also be noted that, in his presentation of the material, the author’s own voice is generally 
absent; only occasionally will he interject a clariication, preceded by a “quḌtu”, as to the 
import of or object by the legal consequent.46 This is consistent with the purposes of a 
37. See Chapter 2 of Al‑Azem 2011 for a prosopographical study of the various branches and schools of anaism in 
Central Asia and beyond, and the relative importance of each of the following works and their authors for rule‑
making in the anafī ḍaḏhab.
38. Burhān al‑Dīn al‑Marġīnānī (d. 593/1197), aḌ‑HŪdāya. Cf. Ibn Abī al‑Wafā’, aḌ‑ awāhŪr aḌ‑ḍu Ūyya, II, p. 627–29; Ibn 
Quṭlūbuġā, Tā  aḌ‑tarā Ūḍ, p. 206–7; heFFeninG, s.v. “al‑Marghīnānī”, EncycḌopaedŪa of IsḌaḍ, Second EdŪtŪon 2014; 
meRon 2002, p. 410‑16.
39. These inal three — Kanz aḌ‑daqā’Ūq, aḌ‑Wāfī, and aḌ‑Kāfī fī ar  aḌ‑Wāfī — are all works of the same author Abū 
al‑Barakāt ʿAbd Allāh b. A mad al‑Nasafī (d. 710/1310‑11). Cf. Ibn Abī al‑Wafā’, aḌ‑ awāhŪr aḌ‑ḍu Ūyya, II, 
p. 294‑96; Ibn Quṭlūbuġā, Tā  aḌ‑tarā Ūḍ, p. 174‑5.
40. Burhān al‑Dīn Ma mūd Ibn Māza al‑Bu ārī (d. 616/1219), aḌ‑Mu īṭ aḌ‑Burhānī. Cf. Ibn Quṭlūbuġā, Tā  aḌ‑tarā Ūḍ, 
p. 173; ʿAbd al‑ ayy al‑Laknawī, al‑Fawā’Ūd aḌ‑bahŪyya, p. 314, 336–38.
41. ʿAlā’ al‑Dīn al‑Kāsānī (d. 587/1191), Badā’Ūʿ aḌ‑ṣanā’Ūʿ. Cf. Ibn Abī al‑Wafā’, aḌ‑ awāhŪr aḌ‑ḍu Ūyya, IV, p. 25; Ibn 
al‑ʿAdīm, Buġyat aḌ‑ṭaḌab, X, p. 4347.
42. A commentary by Ma mūd b. ʿUbayd Allāh al‑Ma būbī (d. 745/1344) on Burhān al‑Dīn al‑Marġīnānī’s aḌ‑HŪdāya. 
Cf. Ibn Abī al‑Wafā, aḌ‑ awāhŪr aḌ‑ḍu Ūyya, IV, p. 369–70; Ibn Quṭlūbuġā, Tā  aḌ‑tarā Ūḍ, p. 291; al‑Laknawī, 
aḌ‑Fawā’Ūd aḌ‑bahŪyya, p. 338.
43. For more on the periodization of post‑formative anai iqh, see “Chapter 2. History” of Al‑Azem 2011.
44. See, for example, subTelny and khAlidov 1995, esp. p. 226‑36, who present the currŪcuḌae vŪtae of two Timurid 
anafī scholars. In the case of the irst scholar, the HŪdāya is mentioned four times, and the commentary of 
al‑Ma būbī on it once, to the exclusion of any other works of iqh; this likely betrays a basic legal education. In 
the case of the second ḍa yaḫa, the scholar under study was granted authorizations in numerous longer works 
of the ḍaḏhab, such as aḌ‑Mu īṭ aḌ‑Burhānī: this may relect that he was a more accomplished student of law than 
the irst scholar, or it may simply mean that he had been more proicient in acquiring certiicates (Ū āzah‑s) 
from the jurists and scholars whom he had met and with whom he had studied.
45. See, for example, Ibn Quṭlūbuġā’s withering comments on the quality of the judiciary of his day: “The ḍa āyŪḫ of 
our ḍaḏhab hold this position due to the corrupt state of the judiciary… [ āi  al‑Dīn] has said: ‘It is hidden from 
no one that the decisions of the judges of our lands do not carry the weight of a specious argument, let alone a 
proof…’.” (Ibn Quṭlūbuġā, M abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ, p. 192).
46. E.g., in the section treating the legal consequences of a claim (M abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ, p. 91). We shall return to a 
discussion of the signiicance of this in our discussion of his use of binding precedent.
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handbook: the author is not making arguments, per se, as to the substantive dimensions 
of the law. The forum for arguments as to the taṣ ī  — where the ḍaḏhab’s centuries‑old 
range of legal opinions on substantive iqh matters may be assessed, modiied, and even 
overturned — is the genre of iqh commentary, and Ibn Quṭlūbuġā’s own contributions to 
such centuries‑spanning debates may be found in his aḌ‑Taṣ ī  wa‑Ḍ‑tar ī , a commentary 
on the compendium of the ʿAbbāsid‑era Abū al‑ usayn al‑Qudūrī (d. 428/1037).47
The procedural rules following from the doctrine of legal consequences
Upon completing his catalogue of the legal consequences for each topic of law, 
Ibn Quṭlūbuġā returns to the ramiications of the doctrine of ḍ abāt for the judge’s 
responsibilities. There are three distinct but related categories of judgment ( ukḍ) of 
which the judge must not only be aware, but of which he must make explicit mention in 
his judgment.
First, Ibn Quṭlūbughā instructs the legal oicial to examine the objective of the 
litigation: is the case one in which the consequences and efects of a person’s or a group of 
persons’ actions are under dispute? Or is it one in which some other dimension of an act 
is under dispute? If indeed the objective of the litigation is to clearly identify and delimit 
the consequences of a given act, then the judge’s task is speciically to issue judgment 
as to the legal consequence: he is to explicitly and unambiguously pronounce upon the 
privileges and duties the act results in and which must be observed by one or both parties, 
these privileges and duties beŪng the consequences of the act. In the case that the objective 
of the litigation is not the clariication of the consequences of a party’s act, but instead 
some other matter (such as the very facticity of a disputed act, or its legality), then he is to 
pronounce only upon that.48
Again, Ibn Quṭlūbuġā wishes to demonstrate that this principle, this division, and 
these procedures are not speciic to the author’s own anafī ḍaḏhab, and, again, to do so 
he cites from the jurisprudential writings of authors from other ḍaḏhab‑s. First, he quotes 
the anbalī aḌ‑MustawʿŪb in order to delimit the range of categories relevant to issuing 
judgment of the second type—i.e. when the objective of the litigation is to resolve a dispute 
as to the status of an act recognized by law, or its functŪon in relation to subsequent acts or 
facts in a case, and not to determine its legal consequences:
The judge (aḌ‑ ākŪḍ) is not to render judgment save in accordance with a legal category ( ukḍ 
arʿī): that is, either obligation (aḌ‑ī āb), prohibition (aḌ‑ta rīḍ), permissibility (aḌ‑Ūbā a), validity 
(aḌ‑ṣŪ a), or invalidity (aḌ‑fasād); likewise, causality (aḌ‑sababŪyya), conditionality (aḌ‑ arṭŪyya), 
and preventiveness (aḌ‑ḍānŪʿŪyya).49
47. Ibn Quṭlūbuġā, aḌ‑Taṣ ī  wa‑Ḍ‑tar ī ; Al‑Azem 2011.
48. Ibn Quṭlūbuġā, M abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ, p. 102.
49. Ibn Quṭlūbuġā, M abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ, p. 102‑03.
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That is to say, the other categories used to assess the moral dimensions of a human 
person’s acts – recommendation (nadb) or dislike (karāha) – are not of relevance to a court 
of law, for, as the author of aḌ‑MustawʿŪb explains, “they do not entail direct coercion or 
inevitable consequences” (ḌŪ‑anna‑hu Ḍā ŪḌzāḍ fī‑hā ḍubā ara wa‑Ḍā ŪstŪḌzāḍ),50 which is the 
only remit of the judiciary. From the perspective of classifying an act in itself, the court 
is only concerned with ḌegaḌ categories: obligation, prohibition, permissibility, validity, or 
invalidity (the legal statuses of an act); and causality, conditionality, and preventiveness 
(the legal functŪons of an act). Here, Ibn Quṭlūbuġā pauses to clarify and emphasize that the 
term “legal consequence” applies to none of these legal categories cited above: these are 
not consequences, or efects, of an act, but only determinations as to its legal status.51
Nonetheless, knowledge of these categories of status and function are important to 
even the judge who is only being asked to determine the legal consequences of an act in 
litigation. Having clearly divided, from the perspective of the concept of the ḍ ab, all 
judgments into being either upon the consequence or upon some other, non‑consequential 
aspect of the act (i.e., its status or function), Ibn Quṭlūbuġā then returns to underscoring 
a point he had made earlier in the preface to the work: namely, that the judge may only 
pronounce upon the actual disputed point of the litigation brought before him, and no 
other. In support of this position, he cites another treatise on the jurisprudence of the 
judiciary, the TabṣŪrat aḌ‑ ukkāḍ fī uṣ Ḍ aḌ‑aq Ūya wa‑ḍanāhŪ  aḌ‑a kāḍ of the Mālikī jurist, 
Burhān al‑Dīn Ibrāhīm Ibn Far ūn al‑Yaʿmurī (d. 799/1397),52 who declares:
The judge may only issue a ruling upon that which has clearly been established in his court, for 
judgments cannot be passed upon non‑existent afairs.53
Why does Ibn Quṭlūbuġā repeat this point again at this juncture? On the one hand, 
there is his concern to demonstrate the existence of a cross‑ḍaḏhab consensus as to the 
theoretical and procedural dimensions of an underlying, trans‑ḍaḏhab jurisprudential 
system. But beyond this, at this exact juncture in the work, Ibn Quṭlūbuġā is also preparing 
to end his treatment of the concept and procedural aspects of the ḍ ab, and to turn to 
the ramiications of legal obligations for the remaining procedures that the jurist will 
pursue in the course of his judicial responsibilities: managing the pleadings, determining 
the relevant binding precedent, and judicial documentation. Before doing so, he must 
make clear to his readership that they are only to adjudge the speciic point that has been 
brought before them, and should only addŪtŪonaḌḌy pronounce upon any corollaries that 
50. Ibn Quṭlūbuġā, M abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ, p. 103.
51. Ibn QuṭḌ buġā, M abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ, p. 103.
52. Ibn Quṭlūbuġā does not actually specify either the name of the author, nor even the full title of the work, 
refering to the work only as ManāhŪ  aḌ‑a kāḍ. Nonetheless, I do not believe we need to hesitate in identifying 
his so‑called “ManāhŪ  aḌ‑a kāḍ” with Ibn Far ūn’s TabṣŪrat aḌ‑ ukkāḍ fī uṣ Ḍ aḌ‑aq Ūya wa‑ḍanāhŪ  aḌ‑a kāḍ; Ibn 
Quṭlūbuġā explicitly cites him and TabṣŪrat aḌ‑ ukkāḍ in his aḌ‑Taṣ ī  wa‑Ḍ‑tar ī  ʿaḌā Muḫtaṣar aḌ‑Qud rī (see, for 
example, p. 121‑22 of that work), likewise when treating jurisprudential problems arising from the concurrent 
jurisdictions of the Mamluk judiciary.
53. Ibn Quṭlūbuġā, M abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ, p. 103.
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are implicit in their judgments. That is to say that in the case of a judgment as to the 
consequences of an act (aḌ‑ ukḍ bŪ‑Ḍ‑ḍ ab), the judge is also expected to make explicit the 
legal status of an act, namely that its having a legal consequence inherently implies, Ūpso 
facto, that it is vaḌŪd:
If the objective of the litigation is to determine the legal consequence (aḌ‑ḍ ab) of an act, 
then the validity of the act must also be established (fa‑Ḍā budd an tuthbat aḌ‑ṣŪ a), in order that 
the act may implicitly be adjudged to be valid; for there can be no legal consequence to an act 
which is not itself valid.54
The judge may legally only pronounce upon the case at hand, as Ibn Far ūn is cited 
in order to establish; the above clause, then, is meant to clarify for the judges reading the 
treatise that their pronouncements as to the implicit validity of an act, when adjudging 
legal consequences, does not transgress this dictum: such a pronouncement is merely a 
procedural exercise meant only to make explicit that which is implicit, for the sake of the 
plaintifs, and for the sake of any possible subsequent judicial action.
Having clariied this relationship between the legal validity and the legal consequences 
of an act, the author reminds the judges that they are only to proclaim those consequences 
and legal efects that are actually possible for any given valid, legal act:
It is stated in both the Badā’Ūʿ and the Mustawʿab: “A legal consequence is the result of a valid act 
(aḌ‑taṣarruf aḌ‑ṣa ī ), and as such the consequence may only be one which may [be possible to] 
be established in the process of that particular act.”55
It is clearly for this purpose of quickly identifying and thus adjudging the correct legal 
consequence for any given act that Ibn Quṭlūbuġā has provided the judges reading his 
handbook with the topically‑organized catalogue of ḍ abāt in the preceding pages.
The inal topic that our author treats is that of tŪḍe: that is to say, the period which may 
elapse between the occurrence of an act and the actualization of its legal consequence. It 
would appear that, in light of many jurists’ imperfect understanding of the meaning of 
aḌ‑ḍ ab, Ibn Quṭlūbuġā wanted to ensure that there remain no misunderstanding as to 
the temporal relationship between an act and the realization of its legal consequence:
[Al‑Kāsānī] states in the Badā’Ūʿ: “The efect of a legally‑permissible act (taṣarruf arʿī) might 
be actualized (yaẓhar, lit. ‘appear’) immediately upon the occurrence of the act, and it might 
only be realized at some remove of time.” It is well known that some legal consequences are 
actualized immediately [after the occurrence of a legal act], while others only at some remove 
of time, as has been mentioned in the HŪdāyah in the section treating the legal consequences 
of a marriage, and just as other jurists have mentioned in the preceding [section cataloguing 
the] legal consequences of acts.56
54. Ibn Quṭlūbuġā, M abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ, p. 104.
55. Ibn Quṭlūbuġā, M abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ, p. 104.
56. Ibn Quṭlūbuġā, M abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ, p. 104.
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Thus, when adjudging a case as to its legal consequences, judges must remain aware 
that some acts efect immediate consequences (e.g. a regular contract of sale, in which the 
property is immediately removed from the possession of the seller and enters immediately 
into that of the buyer),57 whilst others may by their nature necessarily be deferred (e.g. 
a sharecropping contract, in which the legal consequence is the division of the produce 
between the investor and the laborer upon the physical fruition of the produce).58 Being 
mindful as to which acts efect immediate consequences, and which deferred, will prevent 
litigants from misunderstanding when to expect the legal consequences to come into 
efect.
With this, Ibn Quṭlūbuġā has now instructed his readership as to the procedural 
rules and considerations that must be observed when adjudging litigation as to legal 
consequences, in light of the deinition and theory which he had explicated above: the judge 
must limit himself to adjudicating only on what has been brought before him, especially 
in cases addressing actions (that is to say, consequences) of previous court‑sanctioned 
acts, even when the previous court’s ḍaḏab‑jurisdiction difered; he is to explicitly declare 
the legal validity of an act in the process of adjudging a dispute as to legal consequences, 
necessarily implicit as it is; and he must be mindful of the diferent scales of time that may 
occur between a legal act and the actualization of its consequences, in order that imperfect 
instruction at the close of the court’s intervention not lead to further dispute and litigation 
merely due to a misunderstanding of obligations ensued.
In some of the manuscript copies of Mu abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ, Ibn Quṭlūbuġā closes his 
treatment of legal consequence (aḌ‑ḍ ab) with the following:
The practice of the predecessors (aḌ‑saḌaf) was to explicitly state what is implicitly entailed 
by the legal consequences (ḍafh ḍŪ‑hŪ), and not merely to make an oblique reference thereto 
(Ḍaqab). This is particular to cases in which the legal consequence itself is the object of the 
litigation, which, all said, is rare. And God knows best. 59
Perhaps our master‑jurist wishes to reassure his readership of judges that, despite the 
conceptual and procedural complexity of the doctrine of aḌ‑ḍ ab, they may at least hope to 
be spared its di culties owing to the rarity of litigation speciically over legal consequences.
Conclusion: The concept of the mū ab and the Maḏhab-Law System
Ultimately, the ḍ ab was only one of a number of the jurisprudential doctrines, 
precepts, and mechanisms meant to ensure a coherent and functional pluralistic legal 
system. Other doctrines, which Ibn Quṭlūbuġā also treats in the subsequent sections of 
his handbook, include the restriction of judicial discretion to the substantive doctrines of 
57. Ibn Quṭlūbuġā, M abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ, p. 85.
58. See Ibn Quṭlūbuġā, M abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ, p. 98.
59. Ibn Quṭlūbuġā, M abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ, p. 104.
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ḍaḏhab of their jurisdictional appointment (taqḌīd); the doctrine of juristically‑established 
precedents (ta rī ), which binds legal oicials to adjudicating only in accordance with the 
ḍaḏhab’s chosen legal rules (aḌ‑ḍutftā bŪ‑hī); limiting and systematizing legal proceedings; 
and the uniication of the formulae of court documentation which may thus be recognised 
across all the ḍaḏhab courts in the realm.60 And, like many of the jurisprudential concepts 
which came to comprise the ḍaḏhab‑law system, the doctrine of “legal consequence” did 
not originate with Ibn Quṭlubuġā or even necessarily with his Mamluk‑era colleagues who 
also wrote on similar themes; as we have seen, the term (or its synonyms) is found in the 
iqh compendia and commentaries of the anafī branches of eleventh‑century and twelfth‑
century Central Asia, as the iqh tradition had much earlier theorized and identiied the 
legal consequences of many legal acts. Rather, by placing the term “ḍ abāt aḌ‑a kāḍ” 
into the very title of his work, Ibn Quṭlūbuġā has signaled the centrality of the doctrine 
to the wider objective of the handbook: namely, securing the unity and coherency of the 
pluralistic Mamluk judiciary and its functioning. Insofar as the judiciary is, ultimately, 
only as uniied and coherent as the judges who comprise it, Ibn Quṭlūbuġā’s eforts in 
delimiting judicial discretion is meant to buttress the consistency of the Mamluk society’s 
legal system: in relation to the judges’s discretion in substantial laws, through tar ī ; in 
procedural laws, through the doctrine of the ḍ ab.
The concurrence of multiple jurisdictions is inherently a threat to the coherence of any 
judicial system; the constellation of jurisprudential doctrines developed by Ibn Quṭlūbuġā 
and the jurists of his era, including that of the ḍ ab, must thus be seen as a coherent and 
integral body of principles and procedures comprising a uniied ḍaḏhab‑law legal system 
meant to avert this very danger. The doctrine of the ḍ ab which we have examined, 
for example, delimits the errors that an inexperienced or otherwise unscrupulous judge 
may inlict due to the latitude permitted by a set of concurrent jurisdictions without any 
wider jurisprudential controls. The doctrine of legal consequences demands that the judge 
limit himself to adjudicating only the legal act which is the object of the case at hand. 
Under threat of having his own decision nulliied by the Chief Judge of this pluralistic 
judiciary, the doctrine ensures that no judge attempts to overturn the legitimate decisions 
of other courts in earlier decisions: the decisions of all ḍaḏhab‑courts must be universally 
recognized by all. The doctrine of the ḍ ab also universalizes across all ḍaḏhab‑s a set of 
steps that must be observed before a court’s decision can result in legal consequences for 
the plaintifs. All of this is only made possible by the ḍaḏhab‑law system: a set of universal 
jurisprudential doctrines and procedures, enforceable under threat of intervention by 
the Chief Judge in consultation with the leading jurists of the age, that undergirds the 
operation of individual ḍaḏhab‑s, court jurisdictions within the Mamluk judiciary.
60. A forthcoming article will complete the study of Ibn Quṭlūbuġā’s handbook for judges, begun here, by treating 
each of the remaining sections on proceedings, binding precedent, and court documentation; and by analyzing 
the relationship between all of the sections of the work and the doctrines which they entail in demonstrating 
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